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A U T H O R . Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay is a modified version of remarks
given at Dartmouth College’s celebration of the 200th anniversary of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward. I am grateful to Justice James Bassett and Professor Donald Pease for spearheading
that event, to John Greabe for getting me involved, and to the University of New Hampshire Law
Review for publishing the proceedings. I first encountered the Dartmouth College case in the
undergraduate constitutional law course taught by the late Professor Vincent Starzinger, who
embodied Dartmouth’s commitment to extraordinary undergraduate teaching and inspired
many of us to become lawyers. Professor Starzinger deserves most of the credit for anything of
value in this essay, but the errors are all my own.
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I N T R OD U C T I ON

Dartmouth College v. Woodward held that a private college’s charter was a
contract, and that the State of New Hampshire’s effort to alter the terms of that
charter impaired the obligation of the contract in violation of the Constitution’s
Contract Clause.1 As a matter of doctrine, Dartmouth College has relatively little
significance today. Its particular holding is readily drafted around. Once the Court
held that the Contract Clause applied only to retrospective impairments of
contractual obligations,2 states could include limitations on the rights conveyed in
such charter at the time they were issued. The Contracts Clause retains more force
in cases involving the State’s own agreements than it does with respect to regulation
of private contracts,3 but contemporary federal litigation under the Contracts
Clause—much less claims relying directly on Dartmouth College—remains quite
rare.4 A plausible working title for these remarks would be: “It is an obscure case, yet
but there are those who love it.”5
Nonetheless, by holding that New Hampshire could not alter the terms of
Dartmouth’s charter, the Supreme Court prevented the Granite State from
interfering in Dear Old Dartmouth’s affairs.6 Dartmouth College is frequently
credited with establishing the autonomy of private higher education in America.7

1

See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

2

See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).

3

See, e.g., United States Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating legislation allowing
a state to retroactively alter the terms of its bond obligations).

4

But see Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 Duke J.
Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 117, 131–34 (2012) (discussing recent Contract Clause litigation concerning
state efforts to adjust their pension obligations).

5

Apologies to Daniel Webster (Dartmouth class of 1801), who, in his argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court on the College’s behalf, famously said, “It is Sir, as I have said, a small college. And
yet there are those who love it!” Or at least we think he said this. Webster’s peroration is not
included in Wheaton’s report of the case. It traces to an account by Chauncey Goodrich, a Yale
professor who attended the argument and thirty-six years later wrote down his recollection in a
letter to Rufus Choate. See generally G. Edward White, The Marshall Court & Cultural
Change, 1815–1935, at 615–16 (abr. ed. 1991) (quoting Choate’s report of the peroration and
expressing some skepticism). Of course, every true son or daughter of Dartmouth accepts the
Goodrich-Choate text of Webster’s peroration as an article of faith—just as we know that the
Lorax is real and that forest green is the most beautiful color on Earth.
6

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 652–54.

7

See, e.g., John S. Whitehead, How to Think about the Dartmouth College Case, 26 Hist. of Educ.
Quart. 333, 334 (1986) (“Almost every previous historian of higher education . . . had asserted in
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Chancellor Kent, for example, said that the decision “did more than any other single
act . . . to give solidity and inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and
commercial institutions of our country.”8 Kate Stith-Cabranes has shown that New
Hampshire’s intentions were plausibly benign.9 But it is hardly difficult to imagine
less savory efforts by state (or federal) governments to undermine freedom of
teaching and inquiry at private universities—perhaps to prevent criticism of
government policy or simply to favor particular government interests.10
When we think of the autonomy of universities in American constitutional law,
we generally think of the First Amendment’s protections for academic freedom.11
But other constitutional principles also protect the autonomy of universities. I
focus here on the important structural role that the Contract Clause played in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward. The Contracts Clause is, at first glance, a rights
provision, protecting individuals from the governmental impairment of their
contractual entitlements.12 But as Akhil Amar has shown, rights provisions play
vital structural roles in American Constitutionalism.13 By insulating private
universities from public control, the Marshall Court’s interpretation of the
Contracts Clause in Dartmouth College helped to ensure that private institutions of
higher learning would remain autonomous voices in American civil society.
The importance of such voices was a central concern for Alexis de Tocqueville,
who published Democracy in America14 in 1835 as the Marshall Court was drawing to

one form or another that the Supreme Court’s decision in that case encouraged the development
of ‘private’ colleges by protecting them from state encroachment.”).
8

Quoted in Justin Zaremby, The Dartmouth College Case at 200, The New Criterion (Feb.
2019), https://newcriterion.com/print/article/10590 [https://perma.cc/R8MU-JE3K]; see also Harry
A. Blackmun, Remarks, in A Ceremony Marking the 175th Anniversary of the Supreme Court
Decision in the Dartmouth College Case 5, 6 (Feb. 2, 1994) [hereinafter 175TH Anniversary
Ceremony].
9

Kate Stith-Cabranes, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Enduring
Significance of Self-Governance, in 175TH Anniversary Ceremony, supra note 8, at 12–13.

10

See infra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.

11

See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
12

The Contracts Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 1. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., The
Contract Clause: A Constitutional History (2016).
13

See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131 (1991).

14

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop,
eds. 2000) (1835, 1840).
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a close. Tocqueville saw democratic equality as the central fact about America.15 He
thought that the great risk that such a democracy would run was the propensity of
democratic levelling to clear out all the intermediary institutions—feudal
aristocracies, church establishments, trading guilds and the like—that once existed
between the individual and the state. With these intermediary institutions gone,
individuals would be ill-equipped to resist a form of “democratic despotism” by
which the State would gather all power to itself in the name of providing for human
wants.16 Tocqueville thought the answer to this propensity in democratic societies
was a robust civil society full of active private associations and other intermediary
institutions.17
It is thus an important but sometimes overlooked part of the genius of our
Constitution that it facilitates the development of a robust civil society. It does not
simply protect the individuals in that society from restriction of their rights; it also
provides mechanisms that encourage the development of vibrant private
institutions capable of checking government action even when individuals cannot.
Dartmouth College is an important part of that story. I also want to argue, however,
that this rosy outcome is not inevitable, and that certain developments in American
politics threaten the ability of private intermediary institutions—including
universities, but not only universities—to play the vital role that Tocqueville and the
Founders envisioned for them.
I.

D A R T MO U T H C O L L E G E A N D T H E C O N T R A C T C L A U S E

The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”18 We generally think about this Clause
as an individual rights provision, and it is. When the Framers worried about the
tyranny of the majority, they tended to have foremost in mind, not white
slaveholders oppressing black people, or religious majorities oppressing dissenters,
but rather populist appeals to oppress creditors by relieving debtors of their
contractual obligations. And so the Contracts Clause, which tends to foreclose debt
relief legislation, was the most important rights provision included in the original
Constitution prior to ratification of the Bill of Rights.19 The sort of economic rights
that the Contract Clause protects have largely fallen out of favor in contemporary

15

See id., Vol. I, Introduction, at 3.

16

See id., Vol. II, Part Four, ch. 2–3, at 640–45; ch. 6, at 661–65.

17

See id., Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 489–92; Part Four, ch. 7, at 666–73.

18

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

19

See generally Ely, supra note 12.
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jurisprudence, but that should not blind us to the fact that the Contract Clause was
the Constitution’s most frequently litigated and enforced rights provision at least
until ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward was a key early precedent establishing the
Contract Clause’s scope and importance.20 The British crown granted a charter to
the trustees of Dartmouth College in 1769. It did so at the urging of Eleazar
Wheelock, a Congregationalist minister who was looking to expand his efforts to
educate Native Americans and to branch out into educating English colonists as
well.21 Although the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case
characterized the College’s founding as a wholly private affair, that account omits
not only significant public contributions of money and land but also a significant
public purpose: “preparing men for positions in the ministry and in civic leadership,
with perhaps some elementary teaching of Indians, to boot.”22 The charter made
Eleazar Wheelock president of the new college for life, and it also allowed him to
choose as his successor his son John Wheelock. Toward the end of John Wheelock’s
thirty-five year tenure, however, disputes arose between him and the College’s
trustees.23 John Wheelock penned an anonymous indictment of the trustees’
meddling in college affairs; the trustees responded with an investigation; and John
Wheelock ultimately sought support from New Hampshire’s Governor and
legislature.24
The Dartmouth Trustees dismissed John Wheelock from the presidency in 1815,
and Wheelock again turned to the legislature for support. The state legislature—

20

For accounts of the case, see Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 15–16; White, supra note 5, at
175–80, 612–28; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First
Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 141–45 (1985).
21

Id.

22

Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 14; see also John S. Whitehead, The Separation of College
and State: Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, and Yale 1776-1876, at 15, 31–36 (1973).
23

John Wheelock appears to have been a somewhat overbearing sort; the trustees would later
complain that “[s]uch men are always the heroes of their own story.” (Quoted in Whitehead,
supra note 22, at 55). As Professor Stith-Cabranes notes, however, the dispute stemmed not simply
from Wheelock’s alleged incompetence and dictatorial tendencies, but also from religious
disputes arising out of the Second Great Awakening. See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 1411–12;
Steven Novak, The College in the Dartmouth College Case: A Reinterpretation, 47 New England
Quarterly 550, 563 (1974). And the State’s attempt to take control of the College was not simply
a naked power grab; rather, it represented a genuine dispute over the appropriate nature of higher
education and the State’s role in it. See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 12–13; Eldon L. Johnson,
The Dartmouth College Case: The Neglected Educational Meaning, 3 J. Early Republic 45 (1983).
24

See Whitehead, supra note 22, at 53–59.
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now controlled by Jeffersonian Republicans hostile to the Federalist trustees—
enacted a statute amending Dartmouth’s charter. These amendments increased the
number of trustees from twelve to twenty-one, empowered the state governor to
appoint the new trustees, and created a board of overseers—also appointed by the
governor—that would control the trustees on important matters.25 The statute even
touched that third rail of Dartmouth alumni politics, rebranding our beloved
College on the Hill as “Dartmouth University.”26 It may be an exaggeration to say,
as David Currie put it, that the legislature had “turned a private school into a public
one”;27 as other historians have pointed out, Dartmouth would still have retained
considerable autonomy under the new arrangement.28 Nonetheless, the changes
were too much for the board. The old trustees filed suit against the College’s
treasurer, who had sided with Wheelock and the State, to recover the College’s seal
and other corporate property from the interlopers. The key allegations were that
the College’s original charter was a contract, and that New Hampshire’s law
reorganizing the College impaired the obligation of that contract in violation of the
federal Constitution.29
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall thought
that “[i]t can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case
constitute a contract.”30 He thus set out to decide two questions: “1. Is this contract
protected by the constitution of the United States? 2. Is it impaired by the acts under
which the defendant holds?”31 The first issue came down largely to whether the
charter was a “public” or a “private” contract:
If the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution, to
25

See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 652; see also Whitehead, supra note 22, at 59–63.

26

See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 10–11; see also Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 664
(Washington, J., concurring) (“The name of the corporation, its constitution and government, and
the objects of the founder, and of the grantor of the charter, are totally changed.”). On the
continually fraught issue of a name change, see, for example, Joseph Asch, Trustees Seriously Debate
Name Change to Dartmouth University, Dartblog (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.dartblog.com/data
/2013/01/010586.php [https://perma.cc/75WJ-9C55] (asserting that “the alumni would be aghast”).
27

Currie, supra note 20, at 143. It is worth remembering that the sharp modern distinction
between “public” and “private” institutions developed somewhat later. Institutions like Harvard,
Yale, Columbia, and Dartmouth all received considerable public support, and had considerable
public involvement in governance, in the early Republic. See generally Whitehead, supra note 22,
at 4–5, 9–52.
28

See Whitehead, supra note 22, at 63–64.

29

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 604.

30

Id. at 627.

31

Id.
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be employed in the administration of the government, or if the funds of the college be
public property, or if the state of New Hampshire, as a government, be alone interested
in its transactions . . . the legislature of the state may act according to its own judgment,
unrestrained by . . . the constitution of the United States.
But if this be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed . . . for objects unconnected
with government, whose funds are bestowed by individuals, on the faith of the
charter . . . there may be more difficulty in the case . . . .32

This may have been, as Judge Henry Friendly suggested, an overly bright line.33 And
Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion that the College fell on the private side of it may
have failed to consider important evidence that would have muddied the waters, as
Professor Stith-Cabranes has pointed out.34 Nonetheless, the Court concluded:
Dartmouth College is an eleemosynary institution, incorporated for the purpose of
perpetuating the application of the bounty of the donors, to the specified objects of that
bounty; that its trustees . . . were originally named by the founder . . . ; that they are not
public officers, nor is it a civil institution, participating in the administration of
government; but a charity-school . . . .35

Hence, the College’s charter was a contract fully entitled to protection under the
32

Id. at 629–30.

33

See Henry J. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private
Penumbra 10 (1969). After all, as Judge Friendly demonstrated, current “state action” doctrine has
“increasingly blurred” the distinction between government and private actors. Id. at 11. It seems
to this author, nonetheless, that one might accept the blurry proposition that many purportedly
private entities may be state actors for purposes of applying constitutional constraints to their
actions, see, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001)
(holding that state interscholastic athletic association was a state actor subject to the First
Amendment even though the NCAA at the college level was not), without necessarily undermining
Marshall’s distinction in Dartmouth College. For example, federal courts law recognizes a number
of different “state-ness” tests for different purposes and in different contexts. See, e.g., Hess v.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) (applying a multifactor test to determine what
actors count as an “arm of the state” enjoying state sovereign test); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (holding that a state officer may be a state actor for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes even if acting in violation of state law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(holding that suit to enjoin a state officer for acting outside his lawful authority under federal law
is not against the “state” for state sovereign immunity purposes). Surely one may read Chief
Justice Marshall as fashioning his particular public/private distinction test simply for the purpose
of determining which state-granted charters trigger the protections of the Contracts Clause. On
the other hand, many of the concerns that Judge Friendly had about an overly expansive state
action doctrine impinging on the autonomy of private institutions have come to pass, as I discuss
in the concluding section.
34
See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 14 (concluding that “the actual birth of the Dartmouth
College was the joint product of private and public assets, of private and public efforts”).
35

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 640–41.
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Contract Clause.36
The Court had even less trouble determining that the act of the New Hampshire
legislature had impaired this contract. Chief Justice Marshall observed that “[t]he
whole power of governing the college is transferred from trustees, appointed
according to the will of the founder, expressed in the charter, to the executive of
New Hampshire. . . . This is not an immaterial change.”37 Importantly, the Court did
not care whether the changes introduced to the College by public governance would
make good policy sense. Those changes, the Court said, “may be for the advantage
of this college in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general;
but it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of that contract,
on the faith of which their property was given.”38 As primary protection for property
rights shifted from contract to due process over the next century, however, the
reasonableness of state interference with contractual rights would become the
central question even when the Contracts Clause itself was invoked.39
The outcome in Dartmouth College was hardly inevitable. In particular, it was
not obvious that the Court would extend the Contract Clause’s protection to
corporate charters. As Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged, “[i]t is more than
possible, that the preservation of rights of this description was not particularly in
the view of the framers of the constitution, when the clause under consideration
was introduced into that instrument.”40 Rather, he suggested, “interferences of
more frequent occurrence, to which the temptation was stronger, and of which the
mischief was more extensive, constituted the great motive for imposing this
restriction on the state legislatures.”41 Marshall no doubt had in mind the debtor
relief legislation adopted by several state legislatures during the Confederation
period.42 By restricting debtor relief legislation, the Contract Clause protected

36

See id. at 650.

37

Id. at 652.

38

Id. at 653.

39

See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1987); Energy
Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1983); see also Ely, supra note 12,
at 245–47.
40

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644; see also White, supra note 5, at 176 (“[I]t was by no
means clear that a royal charter, imposing no limitations on its recipient, was a contract within
the meaning of the Constitution.”).
41

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644.

42

See Ely, supra note 12, at 8–9; see also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, at 403–09 (1969) (identifying state debtor relief legislation as one of the key
abuses of legislative power that concerned the Constitution’s framers).
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contracts among private individuals and entities. The Clause prevents the
government from helping out one set of private parties (debtors) at the expense of
another set of private parties (creditors) by restricting the debtor’s obligation to pay
or the creditor’s remedies to enforce the deal.
Dartmouth College applied the Contract Clause to a different scenario entirely,
however. Like its predecessor case Fletcher v. Peck,43 Dartmouth College dealt with the
State’s own contracts, not contracts among private actors.44 But the State’s contract
in Fletcher was a simple deal to sell land (if you can call a fraudulent deal to sell most
of the later states of Alabama and Mississippi “simple”).45 The contract in Dartmouth
College was the College charter itself—that is, it was an agreement that not only
formalized a transaction, but created an institution. The Supreme Court’s holding
that the State of New Hampshire could not retroactively alter the terms of the
charter established Dear Old Dartmouth’s autonomy from government control. As
Justice Bushrod Washington’s concurrence put it, “private and particular
corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private persons, are subject to
the private government of those who erect them.”46
Some scholars have insisted that the historical evidence supports application of
the clause only to contracts among private parties, although recent scholarship
disputes this view.47 Evidence suggests, for instance, that the Framers may have
intended to respond to controversies over legislative revocation of the charter of the
Bank of North America.48 In any event, my point is simply that even though
Marshall’s opinion focused on whether Dartmouth’s charter was the sort of charter
protected by the Contract Clause—that is, whether the institution it created was
“public” or “private” in character—the decision is also significant for its affirmation
that charters could be covered at all. That affirmation had significant institutional
consequences for American civil society.

43

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

44

Although the Court focused on whether the charter had created a “public” or “private”
institution, the charter itself was plainly a “public” contract in the sense that the State was a party
to it.
45

See generally White, supra note 5, at 602–03; Currie, supra note 20, at 128–29.

46

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 660 (Washington, J., concurring).

47

Compare Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution
(1938) (arguing that the clause protected only contracts among private parties), with Ely, supra
note 12, at 269–70 (rejecting this claim).
48

See Ely, supra note 12, at 9–10.
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I I . T HE S T R U C T U R A L D I ME N S I O N O F R I G HT S C L A I MS

One can’t be much of a vox clamantis in deserto49 if the Government is telling one
what to cry out about. American law has long respected the importance of
institutional autonomy for colleges and universities, although nowadays we
typically look to the First Amendment as the primary ground for that autonomy.50
But the early Republic lacked modern conceptions of academic freedom, and the
First Amendment did not yet bind the State of New Hampshire in 1819.51 Historian
Jurgen Herbst thus describes the Court’s Contract Clause holding in Dartmouth
College as “the magna carta of the American system of higher education in which
private and public institutions develop side by side, and the private colleges are
protected against state violation of their charter without their consent.”52
The Court’s decision ensured the College’s ability to choose its own path
without state interference on any number of issues of the day: how to respond to
the evangelical tide of the Second Great Awakening; whether to remain an island of
Federalist politics amidst a rising tide of Jeffersonian Republicanism; whether to
focus on a classical education heavy with dead language or to teach more practical
subjects like agricultural science.53 Today, the College is free to be a critical voice in
New Hampshire and national politics, an autonomous forum for debate during
presidential campaigns,54 and an independent pioneer in the College’s many fields
of teaching and research. This independence is not solely attributable to Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, of course. But certainly the Marshall Court’s decision is an

49

The College’s motto, which translates to “a voice crying out in the wilderness.” See Dartmouth
at a Glance, https://home.dartmouth.edu/dartmouth-glance Home.Dartmouth.edu [https://
perma.cc/N6PX-XWLF] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
50

See cases cited in note 11, supra; see also Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?,
77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 907, 925–26 (2006) (offering “an institutional account of the First Amendment”
that “recognize[s] a special place for the country’s colleges and universities, whose historical and
current mission is to play a central role in challenging conventional wisdom”); Joseph Blocher,
Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L. J. 821, 821–22 (2008).
51

See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (recognizing that the original Bill of
Rights did not constrain state governments).
52

Jurgen Herbst, How to Think about the Dartmouth College Case, 26 Hist. of Educ. Quart. 342,
346–47 (1986).

53

See Stith-Cabranes, supra note 9, at 11–13; Johnson, supra note 23, at 50–52.

54

See, e.g., Dudley Clendinen, 8 Democrats are Enticed into a No-Rules Debate, N.Y. Times (Jan. 12,
1984) [https://perma.cc/UFN8-JXHH] (discussing the first televised “talk show” presidential
primary debate at Dartmouth College, conducted in a format outside the control of the
campaigns).
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important part of the story.55
My central point is that the autonomy that the Dartmouth College case conferred
on the College is more than just the sum total of the individual liberties enjoyed by
its students and faculty. By safeguarding the autonomy of private institutions of
higher learning, the Contract Clause plays a structural role. Professor Akhil Amar
has surveyed the many ways in which constitutional provisions that we generally
think of as individual rights provisions also play vital structural roles in American
constitutionalism.56 The Sixth and Seventh Amendments safeguard not only the
individual right of the accused to be judged by a jury of his peers but also the
institutional role of the jury as a democratic check on judges and prosecutors.57 The
Second Amendment protects not only, or even primarily, an individual right to bear
arms but also the institution of the militia as a military check on centralized
tyranny. The original understanding of the Establishment Clause protected state
establishments of religion against federal interference or a federal effort to
establish a national church.
So far, all the examples I’ve given are public institutions—the jury, the militia,
an established state church. These institutions are not that different from more
familiar structural features of the Constitution’s separation of powers. But as
Professor Amar also noted, the Bill of Rights protects the autonomy of a number of
private institutions that also play structural roles. The Press Clause of the First
Amendment, for example, protects the autonomy of the media as a vital check on
both public and private power.58 The Speech Clause likewise protects the rights not
only of individuals but also of the institutions they form in order to exercise a more
effective voice in public affairs, whether those be public interest organizations like
the NAACP or the Sierra Club or quasi-public but extra-constitutional entities like

55

See, e.g., Whitehead, How to Think about Dartmouth College, supra note 7, at 338 (conceding the
importance of the case in this regard despite prior skepticism).

56

See Amar, supra note 13, at 1131–32.

57

See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (“That right [to a jury trial] is no
mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”).
58

See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J., concurring)
(“The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of
public affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”).
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political parties.59 The Religion Clauses, in conjunction, protect the autonomy of
religious institutions that play pivotal roles in American public life, whether by
political activity, good works, or simply offering the example of an alternative way
of life.60 All these institutions fall outside the governmental separation of powers, but
they contribute to the broader separation of powers within American civil society.
The structural role that rights-bearing institutions play is distinct from the
important role that institutions play in assisting individuals who wish to exercise
their constitutional rights. The latter role is more familiar in American law, if not
uncontroversial. In NAACP v. Alabama,61 for instance, the Court recognized that
allowing a corporation to assert First Amendment rights on behalf of its members
could render those members’ speech rights more effective. Similarly—but more
controversially—the Court has allowed corporations to assert free speech and free
exercise claims to challenge federal statutes regulating campaign expenditures and
contraceptive insurance, respectively.62 In this essay, however, I want to focus on
the more structural role of rights that simply ensure the autonomy of private
institutions whose activities contribute to the maintenance of a robust civil society,
whether or not those activities themselves involve the exercise of constitutional
rights.
The Contract Clause, as interpreted in Dartmouth College, falls squarely into this
category of rights provisions with structural implications. This structural aspect of
the case is part of what may be lost in the movement from contract to due process
in contemporary Contract Clause doctrine. Once the Court found that the College
Charter was a protected contract, it asked only whether the State of New
Hampshire’s law purporting to modify that contract had modified the charter’s
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terms and transferred power to govern the institution from the Trustees to the
State.63 It didn’t ask whether the educational reforms that the State had arguably
taken control of the College to effect were reasonable or beneficial. As Professor
Stith-Cabranes has demonstrated, they quite plausibly were reasonable and
beneficial.64 Contemporary Contract Clause doctrine, which is modeled on the Due
Process Clause’s deferential reasonableness test,65 would have asked precisely that
question.
One hopes that if the contemporary Court confronted a Contract Clause case
like Dartmouth College, where the question is the State’s power to alter an agreement
providing for an institution’s basic autonomy, the only issue would be whether the
challenged law meaningfully impaired that autonomy. That is what the Court has
done in analogous cases under the Religion Clauses. In the Hosanna-Tabor case,66
for instance, the Court unanimously confirmed the “ministerial exception,” which
guarantees religious institutions’ autonomy to choose whom they like to perform
ministerial functions without regard to the reasonableness of the constraints that
the State might like to impose. The crucial point is that the movement from contract
to due process in protecting contractual rights should not be allowed to obscure the
Contract Clause’s important structural role in protecting the autonomy of
contractual institutions.
I I I . P R I V A T E C OL L E G E S , I N T E R ME D I A R Y I N S T I T U T I ON S , A N D T H E
C ON S T I T U T I ON A L S A F E G U A R D S OF C I V I L S OC I E T Y

The remainder of this essay considers the importance of this sort of
institutional autonomy for American politics and society. To do that, I turn to Alexis
de Tocqueville’s analysis of American society, which he published in 1835 and 1840
at the close of the Marshall Court.67 Tocqueville thought that the dominant
characteristic of American democracy was the widespread condition of equality
among Americans; equality was, for him, “the generative fact from which each
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particular fact seemed to issue.”68 Although he did not overlook the glaring
inequalities of slavery,69 he focused on the absence in white American society of the
fixed social hierarchies associated with European monarchy and aristocracy.70
Tocqueville thought American equality left our society open to a particular
danger, however, which he variously called “individualism” or “democratic
despotism.”71 He worried that “when citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes
difficult for them to defend their independence against the aggressions of power.”72
This is in part because equality tends to induce each citizen “to isolate himself from
the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side with his family and his
friends, so that after having thus created a little society for his own use, he willingly
abandons society at large to itself.”73 Moreover, the tide of democratic equality
tends to wash away all the traditional intermediary institutions that used to stand
between the individual and the state: the aristocracy, the established Church, the
merchant and craft guilds, and the like.74 Once this occurred, Tocqueville worried,
the individual would find herself isolated from her fellows and unable to prevent the
inexorable expansion of the State.75 This would end, Tocqueville believed, not in the
68
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69
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violent tyranny of past ages but in a despotism that “would be more extensive and
milder, and [that] would degrade men without tormenting them.”76 These concerns
about the erosion of the American social fabric still echo in the work of
contemporary social scientists like Robert Bellah77 and Robert Putnam.78
Tocqueville thought the way out of this dilemma for egalitarian democracies lay
in Americans’ propensity to replace the old intermediary institutions with a wide
array of decentralized political institutions and private associations.79 These
institutions and associations tended to pull individuals out of themselves and
encourage them to combine and cooperate with their fellow citizens.80 As John
McGinnis explains, “[c]ivil associations promote reciprocity among their members
and create social norms from which other individuals can voluntarily choose. In
this way they generate what modern sociologists would call social capital: the glue
that binds society together through a group of interlocking networks.”81 Edmund
Burke expressed a similar idea when he said that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision,
to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it
were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed toward
a love to our country, and to mankind.”82
One might think of these civic institutions in terms of James Madison’s
“extended sphere” of the American Republic, in which a “greater variety of parties
and interests” competes, cooperates, and negotiates.83 Madison’s extended sphere
is inhabited not by individuals, but by groups and institutions. This grand mosh pit
of clashing interests and institutions provides a filter and a check upon the selfish
interests of particular factions, but it depends on the existence of a vibrant civil
society full of varied intermediary institutions. As Tocqueville put it, “[a] political,

76

Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. 2, Part 4, ch. 6, at 662.

77

See Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William N. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, & Steven
M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985).

78

See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (2000). See also Myron Magnet, The End of Democracy in America, City J., Spring 2016,
at https://www.city-journal.org/html/end-democracy-america-14332.html [https://perma.cc/
MCM6-A4FX] (arguing that Tocqueville accurately—and ominously—predicted the growth of the
centralized American administrative state).
79

See Tocqueville, supra note 14, Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 489–92; Part Four, ch. 7, at 666–73.

80

See id., Vol. II, Part Two, ch. 5, at 492.

81

McGinnis, supra note 74, at 491.

82

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 41 (J. G. A. Pocock ed.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790).

83

See The Federalist No. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961) (1787).

55

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

18:1 (2019)

industrial, commercial, or even scientific and literary association is an enlightened
and powerful citizen whom one can neither bend at will nor oppress in the dark and
who, in defending its particular rights against the exigencies of power, saves
common freedoms.”84
Tocqueville gives us a lens to understand not only Federalist 10 but also
Federalist 51, in which Madison talks about institutional checks and balances in the
separation of powers.85 Federalist 51 focuses on public institutions: the mutually
checking prerogatives of Congress, the President, the Judiciary, and (at the end) the
States.86 But Tocqueville emphasizes what Madison also recognized in Federalist
10, which is that the structure of civil society itself is crucial in maintaining
constitutional government.87 A civil society full of robust intermediary institutions
both helps prevent concentrations of power within the Government and also keeps
the Government from dominating the private sector.88 With apologies to my friend
Heather Gerken, who wrote an article entitled “Federalism All the Way Down,”89 we
might call this “Separation of Powers All the Way Out.” But whatever we call it, the
key point is that “constitutionalism relies not only on the separation and limitation
of the powers of the political authority, but also on the existence and health of
authorities and associations outside, and meaningfully independent of, that
political authority.”90
What does all this have to do with the Dartmouth College case? I want to make
both a general and a more specific point. The broad point is that the constitutional
order does not simply piggyback upon a pre-existing civil society; it helps to create
and perpetuate that society by protecting the autonomy of private intermediary
institutions. As I’ve already noted, the Press Clause helps generate and preserve an
independent Fourth Estate, while the Religion Clauses help encourage and protect
robust religious institutions and associations that are independent of state control.
Likewise, Dartmouth College’s construction of the Contract Clause protected these
intermediary institutions’ integrity and right to self-government. As Judge Henry
Friendly put it, “one of the great contributions of the Dartmouth College decision was
84
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the impetus it gave to voluntary associations as a factor in American life.”91
The narrow point has to do with private colleges and universities in particular.
The last time that the College called people together to celebrate Daniel Webster’s
glorious victory—on its 175th anniversary in 1994—Justice Harry Blackmun affirmed
that “the decision provided a safeguard for the development of private education in
this country.”92 Many factors, of course, contributed to the development of private
higher education, and the modern divergence of public and private models didn’t
really crystallize until the 1870s.93 But Justice Blackmun was not wrong to suggest
that Dartmouth College played an important role. For one thing, as Professor Eldon
Johnson observed, it produced “a chilling effect on state intrusion into higher
education governance anywhere anytime.”94
As I’ve already discussed, a variety of constitutional features—including not
only the Contract Clause but also the Free Speech Clause (protecting academic
freedom), the Religion Clauses (protecting the autonomy of sectarian religious
colleges and universities, which for the first century or so was nearly all of them),
and the structure of American federalism—have helped bring about precisely the
sort of robust and diverse civil society in the educational sphere that Tocqueville
would have praised. We have outstanding research institutions like M.I.T. and
Harvard, vibrant sectarian institutions like Notre Dame and Brigham Young,
iconoclastic dissenting enclaves like Oberlin and Hillsdale, and even a few
professional sports franchises like Oklahoma and Ohio State. These varied
institutional models are bound to produce a variety of perspectives and outputs. It
would be a mistake to leave out the state schools. One irony of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward was that the menacing governmental entity was the State of New
Hampshire—not exactly an imposing government by today’s standards.95 By
deciding not to create a great centralized national university, and by facilitating the
development of state land grant colleges through the Morrill Acts,96 Congress
ensured a decentralized future for American higher education even within the
public realm. American higher education is a Madisonian extended sphere.
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And this robust educational constellation does, in fact, perform many of the
functions Tocqueville praised in American private associations. College and alumni
communities do draw individuals out of their private lives and into community with
their fellow members, often for decades after graduation. Colleges habituate
individuals to serve others, and they train them to do that service effectively. They
may be important participants in national political debates, such as affirmative
action,97 and their internal controversies train individuals to be effective
participants in broader debates later on. All this is possible, in part, because the
Constitution’s rights provisions do not simply empower individuals, but give rise to
institutions playing structural roles.
Characteristically, I am going to end with a worry. Just as private institutions
may play an important role in the separation of powers, broadly construed, so too
that role can be undermined by the same sorts of forces that have undermined
separation of powers in the public sphere. One thing plaguing contemporary
constitutional theory—and making it a lot more interesting—is the need to revise
our assumptions about how institutional checks and balances function in light of
changes in the nature of American political life.98 One such change is a general
decline in social capital; as Robert Putnam has observed, “we have been pulled apart
from one another and from our communities over the last third of the century.”99
The other change, of course, is increasingly high degrees of partisanship and
ideological polarization.100
One can readily see how polarization undermines the effectiveness of other civil
society institutions. Polarization has fragmented the media, for example, so that
Americans of different ideological persuasions can pretty much choose their media
outlets so that they only hear what they want to hear.101 Churches and other
religious institutions have to some extent followed a similar path, and the
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increasing secularism of one party and defensiveness of the other threatens the
ability of religious institutions to straddle and meliorate ideological and political
divides.102
Similar things are happening to institutions of higher education. On the public
side, the impression that public universities are out of step with the viewpoints and
needs of the run of American society has led to incursions on the independence of
those universities. This has happened, for instance, both in my native state of Texas
and my current home of North Carolina.103 But the problem is not confined to
public institutions. The perception (and often the reality) that colleges and
universities of all stripes have largely taken sides in the partisan and ideological
wars104 has hurt the credibility of academic voices in political and policy debates and
may, in the long term, prompt those who feel excluded by all this side-taking to seek
other educational models altogether.105
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A related concern was voiced by our own Kate Stith-Cabranes at the 175th
anniversary gathering. She pointed out that:
[T]oday the government’s ability to circumscribe the autonomy of colleges and
universities—and, of course, note it is the federal government more than the states
which threatens to do so—is less likely to take the form of direct legislative fiat and more
likely to take the form of conditions attached to the receipt of government aid.106

These sorts of conditions have enabled national executive agencies under both the
Obama and Trump administrations to induce important changes to university
governance through “dear colleague” letters.107
I would submit that the tendency of educational institutions to take sides in the
ideology wars has undermined their autonomy in these settings. It is a
commonplace of separation of powers scholarship that partisan allegiances cause
different institutions of government to be less interested in checking
encroachments by the other branches when the same political party controls both
branches.108 Partisan agreement may have a similar effect of causing universities
to give up too much autonomy when intrusive government measures dovetail with
their own ideological convictions. On the other hand, forces seeking to intrude on
university policy in less congenial ways may take arguments for institutional
autonomy less seriously when those arguments are not consistently advanced. At
Duke, where I teach, some of those chickens may be coming home to roost as the
Department of Education has threatened to pull federal grants from a Middle East
studies program that the Department views as biased.109
As Professor Stith-Cabranes acknowledged twenty-five years ago, it is hard to
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oppose intrusions on institutional autonomy when the measures in questions seem
profoundly just and correct as a matter of substance.110 But structural values will
not endure if we only defend them when they suit our substantive preferences.
More fundamentally, it is important to recognize that much of the value of private
intermediary institutions in civil society may stem from their ability, at least in
theory, to straddle and meliorate the divides that convulse the governmental sphere.
Colleges and universities should be a place where people of varying views come
together, and the formidable bonds of loyalty that places like Dear Old Dartmouth
engender ought to be a source of common ground. That will help us remember
more generally that Americans who passionately disagree about this or that burning
issue of the day nonetheless share important things in common.
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